Canadian Institutional Incompetence

In All Respects NOT Ready

Most Canadians would hold the belief that their sacred institutions from the Federal Parliament down through their Province and Municipal elected officials would have their backs in time of strife or mayhem. Most Canadians have access to 911 service whose operators quickly determine, “Police, Fire, or Ambulance”. In extremis, when provincial resources fail, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are on call for Aid to the Civil Power operations.

The public should expect that with the billions of tax dollars spent on emergency preparedness with the central coordination run through Public Safety Canada that Canadians should be well taken care of in the event of calamity.

Well, Canada, depending on the scope of the disaster, be prepared to look after yourself.

Here are a few examples to illustrate my point:

A snow covered Argus at the Comox Air Museum – Photo courtesy of Katherine Bickford, http://carlykb.com/gateway/
Comox Snowfall Cancels Christmas Military Flights

If anyone has lived on the West Coast of BC, either in the Lower Mainland or on the Island, they are somewhat acquainted with that weird meteorological phenomenon called snow. It will occasionally show up, usually in multiples of feet, create absolute havoc for a couple of days, then melt with the subsequent rain. The rest of Canada would take the opportunity to make fun of us for a change while they were suffering from the more usual Canadian winter weather.

Up Island at 19 Wing Comox, there is usually a good wallop of the white stuff maybe once a year. The RCAF are not stupid and like any Canadian airport, they have a Snow and Ice Removal (SNIC) plan. But all the planning does not help when a particular weather event happens rarely. Hence, each and every year, it is like people have never seen snow or what to do with it when it shows up.

That is when the holes of the Swiss cheese all line up and an incident happens such as one occasion while I was the Duty Operations officer for 442 Squadron.

The Christmas Military Flight Airbus had flown into Comox and was ready to start the long cross country journey across Canada to Trenton, ON. A large snowfall had occurred overnight and since the airfield did not have a hangar large enough, the aircraft remained parked outside overnight. The actual snow was not so much the issue as was the ability to de-ice the aircraft whose dimensions were too large for the civilian terminal machines to take care of.

Back in the day when the Boeing 707, aka White Knuckle Airlines, flew, the frequency of flights would be two or three times per week. Nowadays, larger military aircraft flying into Comox is rare.

But, hey, no problem, call in the military de-icer. Whoops, the one guy who knew how to run the machine was on Christmas leave out of the Valley. Okay, we pulled out the Operator’s Manual to see how to run the machine. Fine, but whoops again, the barrels of de-icing fluid were half a mile up a snow plugged road that was very low on the SNIC plan priority list. Long story short, the Keystone Kops bumbling caused the cancellation of the flight and the ruination of hundreds of military member’s Christmas plans.

Lesson Learned: This debacle occurred due to a combination of factors involving the rarity of a weather event and the nature of how the RCAF is run. Snow occasionally shows up in Comox but it is only a bother for a few days until the rain washes it away. You can plan for it but institutional memory is short and can be complicated with frequent postings or lack of adequately trained personnel who are not familiar with how to handle semi-complicated situations.

If the wind was steady and freshening from the Southeast, would not a prudent person look towards where the fire might head towards?
Town of Slave Lake Burns Down in 2011

According to news articles and the subsequent 2012 KPMG report, it was a miracle that no one died during the evacuation of the Town of Slave Lake on May 15, 2011.

Words like massive, unprecedented, rapidly-developing were used to describe a wall of fire being pushed into town by 100 km/h winds. The fire, later determined to be arson, cost Albertans about $1 billion in damage and recovery costs.

The arsonist has yet to be identified and no blame was ever laid against any of the people in charge of responding to the inferno. But should have the authorities been better prepared?

The KPMG report made a series of recommendations mostly based on better communication and cooperation amongst the disparate entities in charge of the area’s emergency response. One crucial factor overlooked, except for a single minor mention related to the Provincial Operations Center (Pg 63), was literally no one was paying attention to the weather!

It was a hot, dry spring in fire country. There were numerous wildfires in the area, some to the SW of town and Fire 65 (the one that burnt down the town) was to the SE. Would you not think that a single person in charge would consult a weather forecast to see if any weather phenomenon such as high winds were in the forecast?!?

In the military, literally every briefing started with a Met Report so that everyone, especially the Commanding Officer, could weigh the risks associated with the forecast weather situation. Then as the day goes on, there are regular weather updates especially if a rapidly approaching system is expected to impact operations. Also, when all else fails, you look out the window.

Going back through the meteorological records from the Slave Lake Airport starting at midnight May 13, the wind was from the West at 20 kph, veered North at 0900, dropped to 10 kph and continued to veer to ESE at 1600 picking up again to about 20 kph. The barometric pressure started to steeply decline at this point. For the next three days the wind stayed in the Southeast with the really strong winds occurring on the 15th, the day of the main evacuation.

This type of weather indicates there was a deepening, west to east moving, low pressure system with a steep pressure gradient to the west of town. The weather forecasters would have predicted the high winds but no one was paying attention.

Lesson Learned: Complacency and lack of specific knowledge almost got a lot of people killed. The area was described as ‘fire country’ so no one was particularly concerned about fires in the area. The arson, whether deliberate or accidental, should have been foreseen because of the conditions. But the most egregious lack of foresight was the collective oversight of simply looking up the forecast or even noticing that the wind was steady and freshening from the direction of a rapidly growing fire.

Coast Guard Station Sea Island – Photo courtesy of Duane Currie
Lack of Coordination Between Lower Mainland Emergency Services

The over-riding emergency fear for Vancouver’s Lower Mainland is the inevitable ‘Big Quake’. To that end, the province has attempted to prepare for it.

Thankfully, the 2010 Winter Olympics helped officials as they were able to tap into extra money which was put towards emergency preparedness. A great example is the province’s E-Comm system (finally fully rolled out in 2018) whereupon all the seperate agencies can actually communicate with one another.

During an emergency, the first item to fail is communications. While I was with the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) in Vancouver, our communication link onshore at an incident scene was usually a police member with a cell phone. Useless! It was just easier to look for the flashing lights as the hovercraft sped up the Fraser River.

Unfortunately, Canada usually waits until after a disaster before politicians put money into proper prevention. Again with the CCG, we attempted to set up exercises with the police and fire services but were turned down as there was not money in the budget for the extra overtime.

Lesson Learned: Money for proper emergency preparedness in Canada is usually too little, too late. Of course, you have to balance budgets and be reasonable but there are simple, prudent, relatively low cost measures which are not being considered due to other spending priorities. Canada has a history of being reactive vice forward thinking.

This brings me to the unfolding debacle of Canada’s Covid-19 response. I will focus on one small aspect otherwise this article would be too lengthy.

This fall’s response by Manitoba’s Health Ministry with regards to protecting our most frail and elderly has moved into the territory of criminal neglect. From MB’s 2nd Covid-19 News Bulletin dated Feb 07, they were already advising people with flu-like systems to avoid senior residences. Quickly after that, there were ample examples coming from Italy, Spain, Quebec, etc. of what should have been prepared for. The CAF Report on LTC homes was harrowing reading and should have been a wake-up call to the other provinces.

MB Premier Brian Pallister did not listen.

To their credit, the Manitoba health system kept the Covid-19 virus out of the Long Term Care (LTC) homes during the spring spike which decimated the facilities in ON and QC.

But this fall has been a bloodbath, particularly in homes like the Winnipeg Revera Maples Long Term Care Home. According to the government’s News Bulletins, for the month of November, a full 25% of the 200 bed home’s residents have succumbed from the virus. On Nov 13, the Province announced it was setting up a review of Maples plus other hard hit facilities. No kidding!

What exactly did the Province think was going to happen in these homes whose staff consists of low paid, mostly recent immigrants? I do not blame the staff whatsoever as they have been shouldering ever increasing workloads and health issues with miniscule extra support from government. At Maples, it finally reached a breaking point on Nov 6 when the staff mutinied by en-mass calling in sick for the evening shift.

In the Navy, this would have been called a Messdeck Lock-in where the lower deckers refuse to come out until their demands for better treatment and conditions were met. Work people too hard, for too long without support and they become despondent and rebel.

Ministry inspectors and the Health department should have foreseen these issues but blindly disregarded obvious problems with the LTC homes. Too little, too late and in my opinion government officials and LTC home management need to be charged and jailed for negligence.

Do you feel safe with the fact that all these agencies are supposedly in charge of keeping you safe during a major emergency?

I don’t.

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RESCUE SPECIALIST

Fall of 2003 Dive Rescue Team Logo – Credit to Bob McCauley

***UPDATE***

Good news for the CCG Dive Rescue Team. Reports from my Coast Guard contacts say that the decision to axe the team has been rescinded. There was much rejoicing! Making some noise seems to have worked plus last week the unit saved the lives of 2 adults and 5 children who were clinging to their capsized vessel. Penetrating the wreck wasn’t necessary but they could have gone inside if needed. Hopefully the team’s stay of execution lasts for awhile.

***UPDATE***

Ardesco ab Venter

The title, loosely translated from Latin, means Fire from the Belly. This was the motto of our 2003 Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) Dive Rescue training class while we struggled through the labours Tim, John and the other trainers subjected us to in the pool, at the dock shed in Steveston village, Richmond and at the Kitsilano Coast Guard station (CGS). We were the second of two groups trained that year to become members of a newly formed, elite, one of a kind in Canada Dive Rescue team destined to operate out of the CCG Hovercraft station based at Sea Island, Richmond, BC.

Reminiscent of other past Liberal and Conservative government decisions to cut CCG programs like the original dive rescue team, manned lighthouses and the Kitsilano CGS, Trudeau’s government recently announced their intention to axe the current Dive Rescue team and reallocate the $500,000/year savings and personnel to other CCG areas. Search and Rescue (SAR) experts, industry, the public and politicians are lining up against this short-sighted decision while the government plays a bait and switch policy saying they are increasing total CCG funding. As an aside, the CCG has been chronically underfunded for decades and is in woeful shape.

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While determining budgets and public policy, it is difficult for politicians to determine the correct programs and facilities to fund and support. Similar to shutting down a fire hall, you have an emotional public (who votes you in) on one side and bean counters (purveyors of fiscal reality) with hard statistics on the other. In a case of absurdum, you don’t want to over-react to a perceived issue like Homer Simpson and his ill-conceived Bear Patrol.

I would like to present arguments that are both emotional and logical in favour of keeping the Dive Rescue unit intact.

Working as a first responder is a calling, not a labour. I had my first taste of Search and Rescue (SAR) as a young man posted to CFB Summerside, PEI. The waters of the Gulf of St. Lawrence were particularly treacherous mid-December 1990 and numerous sailors from Le Bout de Ligne, Nadine, Straits Pride II and a couple of foreign cargo vessels lost their lives in the three day storm. CCG ships, military aircraft, commercial and fishing vessels conducted a multi-day search. I volunteered to fly in one of the 413 Transport and Rescue Squadron Buffalos as a spotter. Conditions were atrocious in the rear of a bucking Buffalo. The aircraft was being buffeted by 70 knot winds while we flew 500 feet over 70 foot high waves. Reports from a CCG ship stated that sea conditions were so bad that lifeboat survivors next to the ship couldn’t be brought onboard before succumbing to the elements. Most sane individuals run away from conditions like these while SAR personalities see it as an opportunity to deter Death’s collection of souls for that day. I didn’t see a damn thing in the back of that Buffalo in all the hours patrolling back and forth between PEI and Newfoundland but I imagined that those doomed sailors died knowing that we at least tried. The collective SAR effort saved none of the three Le Bout de Ligne sailors, two of the ten Nadine sailors and three of the six Straits Pride II sailors that night. Divers from CCG Ship G.C. Gorton recovered one of the victims from the wreck before it sank. I am sure the families of the rescued and recovered sailors were not thinking of the cost of the efforts put towards finding their loved ones.

CCGS Sea Island Dive Rescue Unit Crest

Fast forward 13 years and I was a newly trained Rescue Specialist with the CCG Dive Rescue Unit. We were pumped up after an intensive seven week training course (last I heard it is now a thirteen week course) and eager to put our life saving skills to use. Media attention was high, we were giving tours, interviews and receiving plenty of favourable press coverage. I did not have a long wait before my first major incident as just a few shifts into my new career, my team responded to reports of a security van in the water at the Vancouver Centerm Pier. The call ran like clockwork. We arrived on scene well within our rescue window, fire trucks were lighting up the area where they said the van had hit the water and we had a diver deployed within minutes. All good except there was no van, no occupants and no rescue. I was the third diver in the water when word came down that our Captain had discovered evidence (scratches on the pier’s bull rail) that the van was probably at the stern of the hovercraft rather than the bow where we had been directed to search. Through no fault of their own, the land based emergency services had pointed us in the wrong direction and we were well past rescuing a husband and father of two young children. Disbanding the Dive Rescue unit will severely diminish inter-agency cooperation and the knowledge base between the CCG, the military and civilian emergency services. Over fourteen years of hard fought expertise is in danger of being lost if this decision goes through. The grown children of that deceased security guard will not be happy that lessons from their father’s death will be forgotten.

Unimaginative bean counters and CCG brass have been whittling away at the Sea Island dive team for decades citing cost as a major issue. I understand that sometimes you have to equate a dollars and cents figure to how many lives have been or may be saved by a particular organization. In my three plus years with the Dive Rescue unit, I saved one life while diving. I also participated in many dive incidents where we were too late. So if you’re looking for bang for your buck, Dive Rescue is a long shot. But if you’re looking at discontinuing the dive capabilities, then who is going to dive on the 10 to 12 vehicles per year that end up in the Lower Mainland waters to check for occupants? Who is going to respond to distressed divers at Whytecliff Park, or the artificial reefs off Vancouver Island and in Howe Sound? Who is going to check overturned vessels or crashed aircraft for survivors? These are just stats of my participation let alone the decade’s worth of SAR calls since I left the unit. Military SAR Technicians, police and fire units are not equipped, or do not have the expertise to respond adequately or timely to the incidents that routinely are attended to by the Dive Rescue Unit. The closest divers who could respond to a vehicle in the water along the Fraser would be the SAR Techs of 442 Squadron based out of Comox on Vancouver Island. There will be gaps and people will needlessly die as impotent rescuers standby.

The plan is to keep the hovercraft and a rescue team operational at Sea Island. They will reduce the five person Rescue Specialist team from five down to probably two. This will drastically reduce the value added capabilities of the response team. During my time at the station, only approximately 10% of the SAR calls involved diving with the rest being a grab bag mix of tracking down ELT/EPIRB signals, vessels in distress, transferring summer sun worshipper patients from Wreck Beach, looking for persons floating in the water, etc. In addition we did buoy tending (visited Sand Heads Light a lot), pollution response (recovered discarded buoy batteries tossed in the water by previous CCG technicians), Community outreach (public tours and numerous media clips), marine patrols (summer standby for Vancouver’s Celebration of Light fireworks shows) assisting university and Department of Fishery scientists, etc. It never hurt to have a few extra trained bodies on hand as spotters, helpers or extra muscle especially for the more involved SAR incidents or day to day CG activities.

The nightmare scenario and the reason for hovercraft stationed near Vancouver International Airport since 1968 is to provide emergency service for an aircraft going down in the low tide mud flats next to the airport. The mud extends for miles and hovercraft are the only practical means of rescuing large numbers of survivors before the tide comes in to drown them. Just such an accident occurred on January 2, 1966 when a Grumman G-21A Goose flown by BC Air Lines overshot a runway and landed out in the tidal flats. It was difficult to extract the 10 survivors as the only means to reach them was by helicopter. A couple of years later, on February 7, 1968, a Canadian Pacific Boeing 707 nearly did the same thing while skidding off the airport’s runway. If the aircraft had continued on into the mud or the shallow waters of a low tide, rescuing the 61 crew and passengers onboard would have been challenging. Later that year, in August, two SRN-6 hovercraft started regular operations from the station. In 1971, Captain John McGrath became the station’s Officer-In-Charge and was instrumental in acquiring the larger hovercraft replacements for the SRN-6s. His other major project was to develop and implement his vision for a fully staffed Dive Rescue capability. Captain McGrath, with the help of Rescue Specialist Tim McFarlane realized this dream with the creation of today’s Dive Rescue unit in 2003. But by government logic, since the Vancouver International airport has never had a serious large scale crash in the mud, then why continue the costly funding of the station and its two expensive hovercraft? Why not retire the hovercraft and rely on shallow draft 733/753 Zodiacs and hope if a plane goes in that it happens at high tide?

The voices against the removal of the Dive Rescue Unit are beginning to intensify. There are clear emotional and logical arguments to keep these knowledgeable, dedicated, experienced heroes in place. The half million/year reported ‘savings’ amounts to .02% of the CCG’s 2017 reported $2.5-billion budget. (If you watch the Simpson’s clip, you’ll see how upset Homer gets over a measly extra $5 Bear Patrol Tax.) Like my former classmates, these dedicated CCG personnel fight with ‘fire in their bellies’ while providing a demonstrated public service to the citizens of their SAR area of responsibility.

Keep the divers at Sea Island and tell the Liberals to stop trying to repeat tragic history.

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