Canadian Institutional Incompetence

In All Respects NOT Ready

Most Canadians would hold the belief that their sacred institutions from the Federal Parliament down through their Province and Municipal elected officials would have their backs in time of strife or mayhem. Most Canadians have access to 911 service whose operators quickly determine, “Police, Fire, or Ambulance”. In extremis, when provincial resources fail, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are on call for Aid to the Civil Power operations.

The public should expect that with the billions of tax dollars spent on emergency preparedness with the central coordination run through Public Safety Canada that Canadians should be well taken care of in the event of calamity.

Well, Canada, depending on the scope of the disaster, be prepared to look after yourself.

Here are a few examples to illustrate my point:

A snow covered Argus at the Comox Air Museum – Photo courtesy of Katherine Bickford, http://carlykb.com/gateway/
Comox Snowfall Cancels Christmas Military Flights

If anyone has lived on the West Coast of BC, either in the Lower Mainland or on the Island, they are somewhat acquainted with that weird meteorological phenomenon called snow. It will occasionally show up, usually in multiples of feet, create absolute havoc for a couple of days, then melt with the subsequent rain. The rest of Canada would take the opportunity to make fun of us for a change while they were suffering from the more usual Canadian winter weather.

Up Island at 19 Wing Comox, there is usually a good wallop of the white stuff maybe once a year. The RCAF are not stupid and like any Canadian airport, they have a Snow and Ice Removal (SNIC) plan. But all the planning does not help when a particular weather event happens rarely. Hence, each and every year, it is like people have never seen snow or what to do with it when it shows up.

That is when the holes of the Swiss cheese all line up and an incident happens such as one occasion while I was the Duty Operations officer for 442 Squadron.

The Christmas Military Flight Airbus had flown into Comox and was ready to start the long cross country journey across Canada to Trenton, ON. A large snowfall had occurred overnight and since the airfield did not have a hangar large enough, the aircraft remained parked outside overnight. The actual snow was not so much the issue as was the ability to de-ice the aircraft whose dimensions were too large for the civilian terminal machines to take care of.

Back in the day when the Boeing 707, aka White Knuckle Airlines, flew, the frequency of flights would be two or three times per week. Nowadays, larger military aircraft flying into Comox is rare.

But, hey, no problem, call in the military de-icer. Whoops, the one guy who knew how to run the machine was on Christmas leave out of the Valley. Okay, we pulled out the Operator’s Manual to see how to run the machine. Fine, but whoops again, the barrels of de-icing fluid were half a mile up a snow plugged road that was very low on the SNIC plan priority list. Long story short, the Keystone Kops bumbling caused the cancellation of the flight and the ruination of hundreds of military member’s Christmas plans.

Lesson Learned: This debacle occurred due to a combination of factors involving the rarity of a weather event and the nature of how the RCAF is run. Snow occasionally shows up in Comox but it is only a bother for a few days until the rain washes it away. You can plan for it but institutional memory is short and can be complicated with frequent postings or lack of adequately trained personnel who are not familiar with how to handle semi-complicated situations.

If the wind was steady and freshening from the Southeast, would not a prudent person look towards where the fire might head towards?
Town of Slave Lake Burns Down in 2011

According to news articles and the subsequent 2012 KPMG report, it was a miracle that no one died during the evacuation of the Town of Slave Lake on May 15, 2011.

Words like massive, unprecedented, rapidly-developing were used to describe a wall of fire being pushed into town by 100 km/h winds. The fire, later determined to be arson, cost Albertans about $1 billion in damage and recovery costs.

The arsonist has yet to be identified and no blame was ever laid against any of the people in charge of responding to the inferno. But should have the authorities been better prepared?

The KPMG report made a series of recommendations mostly based on better communication and cooperation amongst the disparate entities in charge of the area’s emergency response. One crucial factor overlooked, except for a single minor mention related to the Provincial Operations Center (Pg 63), was literally no one was paying attention to the weather!

It was a hot, dry spring in fire country. There were numerous wildfires in the area, some to the SW of town and Fire 65 (the one that burnt down the town) was to the SE. Would you not think that a single person in charge would consult a weather forecast to see if any weather phenomenon such as high winds were in the forecast?!?

In the military, literally every briefing started with a Met Report so that everyone, especially the Commanding Officer, could weigh the risks associated with the forecast weather situation. Then as the day goes on, there are regular weather updates especially if a rapidly approaching system is expected to impact operations. Also, when all else fails, you look out the window.

Going back through the meteorological records from the Slave Lake Airport starting at midnight May 13, the wind was from the West at 20 kph, veered North at 0900, dropped to 10 kph and continued to veer to ESE at 1600 picking up again to about 20 kph. The barometric pressure started to steeply decline at this point. For the next three days the wind stayed in the Southeast with the really strong winds occurring on the 15th, the day of the main evacuation.

This type of weather indicates there was a deepening, west to east moving, low pressure system with a steep pressure gradient to the west of town. The weather forecasters would have predicted the high winds but no one was paying attention.

Lesson Learned: Complacency and lack of specific knowledge almost got a lot of people killed. The area was described as ‘fire country’ so no one was particularly concerned about fires in the area. The arson, whether deliberate or accidental, should have been foreseen because of the conditions. But the most egregious lack of foresight was the collective oversight of simply looking up the forecast or even noticing that the wind was steady and freshening from the direction of a rapidly growing fire.

Coast Guard Station Sea Island – Photo courtesy of Duane Currie
Lack of Coordination Between Lower Mainland Emergency Services

The over-riding emergency fear for Vancouver’s Lower Mainland is the inevitable ‘Big Quake’. To that end, the province has attempted to prepare for it.

Thankfully, the 2010 Winter Olympics helped officials as they were able to tap into extra money which was put towards emergency preparedness. A great example is the province’s E-Comm system (finally fully rolled out in 2018) whereupon all the seperate agencies can actually communicate with one another.

During an emergency, the first item to fail is communications. While I was with the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) in Vancouver, our communication link onshore at an incident scene was usually a police member with a cell phone. Useless! It was just easier to look for the flashing lights as the hovercraft sped up the Fraser River.

Unfortunately, Canada usually waits until after a disaster before politicians put money into proper prevention. Again with the CCG, we attempted to set up exercises with the police and fire services but were turned down as there was not money in the budget for the extra overtime.

Lesson Learned: Money for proper emergency preparedness in Canada is usually too little, too late. Of course, you have to balance budgets and be reasonable but there are simple, prudent, relatively low cost measures which are not being considered due to other spending priorities. Canada has a history of being reactive vice forward thinking.

This brings me to the unfolding debacle of Canada’s Covid-19 response. I will focus on one small aspect otherwise this article would be too lengthy.

This fall’s response by Manitoba’s Health Ministry with regards to protecting our most frail and elderly has moved into the territory of criminal neglect. From MB’s 2nd Covid-19 News Bulletin dated Feb 07, they were already advising people with flu-like systems to avoid senior residences. Quickly after that, there were ample examples coming from Italy, Spain, Quebec, etc. of what should have been prepared for. The CAF Report on LTC homes was harrowing reading and should have been a wake-up call to the other provinces.

MB Premier Brian Pallister did not listen.

To their credit, the Manitoba health system kept the Covid-19 virus out of the Long Term Care (LTC) homes during the spring spike which decimated the facilities in ON and QC.

But this fall has been a bloodbath, particularly in homes like the Winnipeg Revera Maples Long Term Care Home. According to the government’s News Bulletins, for the month of November, a full 25% of the 200 bed home’s residents have succumbed from the virus. On Nov 13, the Province announced it was setting up a review of Maples plus other hard hit facilities. No kidding!

What exactly did the Province think was going to happen in these homes whose staff consists of low paid, mostly recent immigrants? I do not blame the staff whatsoever as they have been shouldering ever increasing workloads and health issues with miniscule extra support from government. At Maples, it finally reached a breaking point on Nov 6 when the staff mutinied by en-mass calling in sick for the evening shift.

In the Navy, this would have been called a Messdeck Lock-in where the lower deckers refuse to come out until their demands for better treatment and conditions were met. Work people too hard, for too long without support and they become despondent and rebel.

Ministry inspectors and the Health department should have foreseen these issues but blindly disregarded obvious problems with the LTC homes. Too little, too late and in my opinion government officials and LTC home management need to be charged and jailed for negligence.

Do you feel safe with the fact that all these agencies are supposedly in charge of keeping you safe during a major emergency?

I don’t.

Blair’s LinkedIn Profile

Blair is a personification of a ‘Jack of All Trades and Master of None’. He has held several careers and has all the T-shirts. Time to add the title Blogger to the list.

SANDBAGGING GRUNT

The utilitarian sandbag, aka this year’s Ontario and Quebec lawn ornament

Reformation of Canadian Emergency Measures

Irrespective of the political mantra of preparing for an increased frequency of fires, flood and pestilence in Canada due to climate change, the average person should be prepared to go 72 hours relying on their own resources before expecting help from government services. Considering a significant number of people still die from BBQ Carbon Monoxide poisoning after the heat goes out, I would say the average person is woefully under-prepared to fend for themselves.

This last round of flooding in Quebec demonstrated the short-comings of our collective response to fluid situations during a disaster response. To begin with, the municipalities who are the front line responders to a crisis are also the same people who authorized putting people into harm’s way to begin with! Land and home owners are local governments largest source of tax income. Yes, the home owner should be doing some due diligence but they are relying on a real estate agent who is trying to make a sale and a hope that the municipality wouldn’t have zoned a house to be built in an unsafe area. Local politicians need to be operating more at arm’s length from the process. But it works out as a good deal because they’re playing the odds of a natural catastrophe being low and then if one does happen, they know the Federal government will pick up the tab. If I were the Feds, I would set up a different system to mitigate zoning habitation in known danger areas.

The next major change should be a more robust role for the military. As the system stands in Canada, a provincial government has to make a formal request for help to the Federal government for the troops to come in. This is called Aid to the Civil Power. Usually after a situation gets away from the local authority, the cries are heard of why wasn’t the military called sooner? There are many reasons such as:

  • Provincial and local officials/organizations do not have the experience to know when they’re getting over their heads. They have neither the training nor knowledge to adequately respond to larger incidents and can quickly be overwhelmed.
  • There may be a reluctance to call the military due to past incidents and prejudices. Oka officials weren’t too keen to have the troops come help in their flooded community.[1]
  • Pride is a factor. Newfoundland officials were reticent to call in the military in the aftermath of Hurricane Igor. Premier Danny Williams wasn’t a big supporter of Prime Minister Stephen Harper and this probably led to a delay in acceptance of federal aid.[2]
  • Perceived costs related to military aid are a factor. By the books, if the military is called in, the province is to pick up the tab. In reality, the Federal government will tally up a bill but only collects partial or no payment.

Under Minister Ralph Goodale, Public Safety Canada[3] coordinates the response to natural disasters. Their efforts trickle down to provincial, city and municipal Emergency Preparedness offices with varying success. Some jurisdictions such as Vancouver are very well prepared but that was because of the lead up to the Winter Olympic Games. One of the best legacies to come from that event was the implementation of E-Comm. E-Comm is a pan-communications system whereby all the disparate emergency services can talk to one another. Previously, the Lower Mainland’s many services wouldn’t have been able to coordinate relief efforts after a significant incident, such as an earthquake. But most areas of Canada don’t have the luxury of monies showered upon them for emergency preparedness, so they make do.

This is why military personnel should be co-managing the Emergency Management Centers (EMCs) similar to the model of the Joint Rescue Coordination Centers. Provincial officials and agencies lack the resources, knowledge and management experience of military personnel. They may run the occasional exercise to test their responsiveness but running exercises is the military’s raison d’etre. Military personnel typically have more experience dealing with, planning for and managing actual emergency situations. From day one in Basic, you’re put under pressure and taught how to survive, function and lead with little sleep, food, supplies or resources. This training plus a substantial bank of discipline, knowledge and expertise is continually honed throughout their entire career. During Brigadier General Turenne’s Operation LENTUS presentation[4] on the recent New Brunswick ice storm military response, he said that you could see the relief of the civilian responders immediately once the troops appeared. The locals were quickly becoming overwhelmed after a few days by even the simple tasks. As the BGen explained, his troops are agile, adaptable, scalable and responsive. Civilian officials/organizers/responders do not have the built-in tools, training or experience of military personnel at managing larger scale emergencies.

Since the military is going to back-stop the efforts of the local authorities, they should have a louder voice on the timing of the deployment and should be able to side-step the provincial officials. Currently, the admirals and generals are already keeping tabs on the domestic front through regular briefings on their areas of responsibility. They are well aware of possible problem incidents and if need be start the Warning Order process and concurrent activity in order to lean forward as much as possible. Their hands are somewhat tied as they have to wait for their official government marching orders. They’ll prod the provincial officials to consider calling for help sooner than later. Meanwhile, military units are quietly pre-positioning resources and personnel because they know the call is coming. If we already had military in the EMCs, they would be able to recognize the need for higher assistance earlier and would bring expertise to the table that their civilian counterparts are lacking. In the Navy or the Air force you’re taught to stay ahead of the ship or aircraft, not to swim in the wake.

The burning of the Town of Slave Lake in 2011 is a good example of when military management would have been more successful. The whole disaster could have been mitigated or avoided all together by the simple accessing of a weather briefing. Military members are constantly receiving or giving briefings in order to disseminate pertinent information. Every briefing starts with a Met Tech report on the forecast weather with associated meteorological products. I’m pretty sure the response to the small wildfires outside of town would have been beefed up if someone had paid attention to the forecast windstorm with its associated 100 kph gusts approaching. Even the Final Report on the Lessons Learned[5] from the fire makes no mention of keeping an eye on weather forecasts.  Civilians have access to important resources but they are either unaware or are ignorant of how to use them.

Minister Goodale noted in a recent press conference that they were going to take another look at the mechanism for responding to future Canadian disasters. Provincial officials should be given less latitude and the Federal government should give the military more latitude to respond without waiting for the red tape, egos and inexperienced civilians to catch up with fast flowing events. The Federal government is effectively picking up the tab anyways and the experts in the military should be running the show.

[1] The Oka Grand Chief unilaterally decided to decline the military’s offer of assistance citing possible hard feelings from the Oka crisis that occurred 27 years ago. Despite an all-out band effort, 30 homes were flooded and 8 were evacuated. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/army-s-offer-to-help-with-kanesatake-flooding-revives-memories-of-oka-crisis-1.4106827

[2] The destructive force of Hurricane Igor was well predicted ahead of time. In addition, calls for federal assistance were delayed or never made. This exasperated the recovery of the storm’s victims. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/n-l-s-post-igor-response-disgusting-resident-1.1022158

[3] Public Safety Canada website. https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/index-en.aspx

[4] A PDF copy of BGen Turenne’s Operation LENTUS 17-01 presentation. https://rusi-ns.ca/op-lentus-17-01/

[5] PDF copy of Lesser Slave Lake Regional Urban Interface Wildfire – Lessons Learned. http://www.aema.alberta.ca/documents/0426-Lessons-Learned-Final-Report.pdf

 

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